The paper examines the policy responses in the UK West Midlands to the successive crises at the car maker MG-Rover. Whilst the firm's eventual collapse in 2005 was a substantial shock to the west Midlands economy, the impact was been much less than was anticipated when the firm was first threatened with closure in 2000 at the time of its break-up and sale by BMW. Although the firm struggled as an independent producer, the five years of continued production until 2005 and the work of the initial Rover Task Force (RTF I), enabled many suppliers to adjust and diversify away from their hitherto dependence on MG-Rover resulting in as many as 10,000-12,000 jobs being 'saved'. This first intervention was later followed by a programme to help exworkers to find new jobs or re-train and assist supply firms to continue trading in the short term. Examination of the effectiveness of these emergency initiatives enables a wider discussion about the nature of industrial policy in the region and the work of the local RDA's cluster based approach to economic development and business support.
Introduction
In early 2000 when BMW announced their intention to sell and break up the UK car maker, MG-Rover, the British Government was largely caught unawares. However, with the subsequent purchase of Land Rover by Ford and BMW's retention of the Oxford (Mini production), Warwickshire (engines) and Swindon (pressings) plants, the worst of the crisis seemed to be over and the remaining need was to address the consequences of reduced production or possible closure of the Longbridge factory in Birmingham. Their response was to set up, in short time, the 'Rover Task Force' under the leadership of the newly formed RDA (Advantage West Midlands -AWM) and with the involvement and support of the Government Office for the West
Midlands (GOWM).
For AWM the MG-Rover crisis came as an early challenge. The English RDAs 2 had just been created, beginning their operations in spring 2000, (see Mawson (2000) and Benneworth (2001) for accounts) and were under Government instructions to draw up economic strategies for their regions. In the West Midlands the RDA (AWM) had set out its initial economic strategy (AWM, 1999) based on a business sector approach derived from the EC funded Regional Innovation Strategy (Oughton et al, 1996) .
However, during the same period the Government adopted cluster policy (DTI, 1998) and requested the RDAs to draw up new plans based on the cluster approach using the Porter model (Andriani et al, 2005) . Thus, although the policy was conceived centrally (DTI, 1998 (DTI, , 2003 DTI/DfEE, 2001) , its implementation was to be at regional level and led by the newly formed RDAs (Peck and McGuinness, 2003) .
As might be expected, with the introduction of any major new governance structure, all RDAs faced a number of initial problems. These included concerns about budgets (Robson et al, 2000) , autonomy and authority (Fuller et al, 2002; Webb and Collis, 2000) . They also had the problem of the short timescale of just six months, allowed by central government, in which to draw up their Regional Economic Strategies (Roberts and Benneworth, 2001) . Such challenges were accompanied by constraints on the resources available to English RDAs compared to the devolved agencies in Scotland and Wales exacerbating the difficulties of establishing political influence amongst the existing, and often better resourced, regional organisations (Burfitt et al 2007) . For example, when AWM produced its original strategy documents, criticisms of both the content and the consultation process (Ayers et al, 2002) were so strong that a major revision was undertaken and the Chief Executive subsequently resigned.
Thus, as well as coming to terms with its newly assigned role and establishing lines of authority and delineation with other local organisations such as the Regional Assembly, the Regional Government Office, the Local Authorities and others, AWM was faced with the first Rover 'crisis' in 2000, with all its potential economic and political fall-out, and the challenge of developing a new policy direction based on clusters.
Cluster policy itself, as derived from Michael Porter's (1990 Porter's ( , 1998 analysis, emerged as the archetype 'soft' intervention measure in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, a number of critical questions emerged about its theoretical underpinnings (Martin and Sunley, 2003) and modes of implementation (Anderssen et al, 2004) including the difficulties of defining geographical or sectoral cluster boundaries or addressing institutional rivalries within cluster support organisations (Enright, 2001) . As a result, the value of the cluster approach as an economic development tool is now questioned in some policy and academic quarters (Peck and McGuinness, 2003; Tully and Berkeley, 2004; Sadler, 2004) or is even seen as somewhat passé against scenarios where future economic development is dependent upon cross-sectoral innovation and 'platform technologies' (Asheim et al, 2006 ).
However, in its favour there are features, such as the focus on selected networks and the concentration on innovation (Raines, 2002) that had the potential, for AWM, and the West Midlands, to develop new initiatives to help address the over-reliance on the automotive industry and on Rover in particular. In the event, after much discussion, AWM identified 10 target clusters (AWM, 2001) with 'automotive' included as one of 5 described as 'established' (transport technologies, building technologies, food and drink, tourism and leisure and high value consumer products), together with 7 others categorised as either 'growing' (ICT, specialist business and professional services) or 'aspirational' (interactive media and medical technologies).
In summary, the RDA was faced with addressing a crisis in the short term while creating structures and mechanisms to implement cluster policy which was untried in the UK and about which it had only limited understanding (Burfitt et al, 2007) and with limited budgets. Not surprisingly it fell back on existing structures and funding arrangements and tried, with limited success, to meld these into its overall cluster plan. In this account of the implementation of the 'Rover package' we trace the actions taken and their success, or otherwise, against the background of global pressures, the on-going changes in the West Midlands automotive industry and the policy debate. In doing so, we examine the difficulties of applying cluster policy to a global industry, its ability to deal with shocks requiring immediate action, and the RDA's attempts to integrate the cluster concept with more traditional business support and area regeneration measures .
The Rover Task Force Mark 1 (RTF1)
With the purchase of the Longbridge plant by the Phoenix 3 consortium, the Government saw a settlement that, despite its inherent weaknesses, was politically popular and satisfied the Trade Unions. In consequence it saw the Rover issue as 'closed' and felt that no further action was necessary. However, the GOWM, in private discussions with Stephen Byers (then Secretary of State at the DTI), pressed, and won the argument, for a package of measures to support businesses most dependent on MG-Rover custom and, at the same time, address long-term weaknesses in the in the regional economy. 4 Thus the Rover Task Force Report (RTF, 2000) focused on the inter-linked themes of modernisation (with funding of £17 million), diversification (£19.7 million) and regeneration (£22 million). A further action was to extend the existing Accelerate Programme of supply chain improvement outside the confines of the then Objective 2 area to offer support nationally to companies in the Rover supply base (see Accelerate, 2002) .
In fact Accelerate had been in existence since 1996 with the objective of providing individual companies with small grants to support process improvement (so-called 'lean manufacturing') at shop floor level. However, whilst Accelerate was given extra resources, the RTF also recognised that over-reliance on the automotive sector, and MG-Rover in particular, plus the concentration in low value-added 'metal bashing', and a lack of a significant involvement in higher value-added areas as electronics, communications or fuel saving technologies, meant the region was particularly vulnerable given the global changes taking place. Thus while Modernisation included a number of linked initiatives to improve competitiveness, through increased productivity, the new Diversification programme sought to help suppliers diversify away from Rover, and from automotive in general, by encouraging the application of engineering skills to other industries such as medical and nano technologies. Delivery of all these initiatives was through a combination of existing organisations including
Accelerate, based at Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, and the Small Business Service operating through the network of Business Links.
Thus the support actions arising out of the first Rover Task Force were, for the most part, not based upon the cluster concepts of networks but on 'old fashioned' industrial policy. Grants were available at the level of individual companies, which although having some involvement with the sector, were often best described as 'manufacturing', rather than automotive, since in many cases they also supplied other industries. (MacNeill, et al, 2001) Given the on-going concern about Rover's long term prospects, RTF1 also initiated 
The West Midlands and its automotive industry
The region has a history of automotive production dating back to the first factory of However, despite these high profile closures, the West Midlands is still at the heart of the UK auto industry, with around 15% of car production, 28% of market value, and 28% of UK jobs in the sector (ONS, 2005) . There is a large supply industry including the legacy of first tier suppliers that evolved alongside the auto makers and an extensive supply matrix of smaller companies still largely geared to the former volume production. The cluster can thus be described as 'mature' and 'undergoing change in common with other old industrial clusters ' (Rosenfeld, 2002) . Although the current production volume, at around 15% of the UK total, is considerably lower than the 30% a few years ago (MacNeill, 2003) , the high value of the vehicles produced is reflected in the market value of production at 28% of the UK total.
Collapse and Impact
The 'final' collapse of MG-Rover in 2005, although widely predicted by industry experts, sent shock waves through the region. The firm's turnover accounted for as much as 1% of regional GDP and £200 million a year in government revenue alone was lost. The firm ceased operations owing £1.4 billion to creditors, with £109 million owed to UK-based suppliers (House of Commons, 2006) , who may (eventually) see only around a penny in the pound for what they were owed. MGRover's inability to pay its suppliers, and the resulting cash flow problems in the supply chain, cut off the supply into the factory (and caused the final collapse). It also meant that it was impossible for the administrator to restart production. The pension fund deficit also ran to around £500 million, with the new Pension Protection Fund (backed by private sector money) having to make up the difference. In addition to the 6,000 workers who lost their jobs at Longbridge, the supply regional supply was forecast to be badly hit. The 'jobs multiplier' in the car industry is difficult to calculate, depending on the degree to which the car is made in house as opposed to assembly of bought-in components, as well as the degree to which components are sourced locally as against internationally. Given such differences, multipliers have been estimated to range from 1:1 to 1:4. However, in the case of Longbridge, the combination of in-house engine production and a shift to overseas sourcing meant a relatively low local jobs multiplier nearer to the 1:1 end of the range, implying a maximum of around 12,000-13,000 job losses in the broader economy. This 'back-ofthe-envelope' 1:1 calculation in fact quite closely matches the physical 'head-count' 'Economic Strategy for the Region cannot be based on the assumption that everything will go as we hope. The Rover Task force has been widely praised for its work in supporting the local economy following the collapse of MG Rover in 2005. The work is not over. There are still far too many people in parts of Birmingham who want to work but cannot find suitable, long term positions which make the best use of the skills they have'.
Recognising Policy Successes and Shortcomings
The actions taken to address the on-going MG-Rover difficulties from 2000 to 2005
can be described as a successful example of crisis management. As outlined above, there were clear benefits in addressing the short-term market needs of local supply companies and the unemployment that resulted from the final closure of the company.
In policy terms the crisis prompted an acceleration of regional-level initiatives which have undoubtedly brought benefits to the local economy. Firstly, the modernisation and diversification agendas recognised the need to shift suppliers away from dependence on MG-Rover; in so doing, they assisted firms looking for new markets and applications and contributed to the 10,000-12,000 jobs 'saved' over 2000 to 2005.
Secondly, the MG-Rover crises kick-started a regeneration agenda and the development of spatial targeted policies to develop new technologies centred on the corridors, which in two cases, at least, have begun to draw in other key local organisations such as universities.
More broadly, the crisis highlighted the need to move the auto 'cluster' towards highperformance and prestige markets, to diversify the economic base away from dependence on the sector, as well as the need to overcome a defensive style of capitalism amongst small firms that mitigates against co-operation and the benefits of innovative activity therein (see De Propris, 2000).
However, whilst recognising these successes, the MG-Rover debacle raises a number of broad policy issues at both the national and local level and highlights the failure to 'join up' different governance levels at key points. At the local level it is clear that AWM faced a number of difficulties in dealing with the MG-Rover situation. The first 'crisis' came just after the RDA had been set up and when establishing RDAs' local political influence was problematic (House of Commons, 2004, p.20; Gough, 2003) especially given the introduction, by different Government departments, of regional centres of the better resourced Small Business Service (SBS) and the Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs). To some extent the crisis assisted AWM in this process, especially in respect of collaboration with the local LSC. Fuller et al (2002) note the lack of formal links between RDAs and the LSCs but observe that Rover was "very important in fostering joint strategy making and action across the region" (ibid).
Given these difficulties, it was inevitable that the RDA would have to turn to established groups and projects for delivery of the RTF measures. Hence, although there were some genuinely new initiatives, such as the 'technology corridors', much of the direct support to manufacturing companies was based upon the existing, and 'Rovercentric' initiative, Accelerate, which had been developed as a process-oriented supplier improvement (short-term reduction in supply costs) programme -as sought by the region's major companies and, in particular, MG-Rover itself. Thus, although the RTF funds provided valuable direct support to individual companies, little was done to address the region's on-going skills shortages (Tilson, 1997) were "offering jobs for the only most highly skilled" leaving "a core of around 75% of the Longbridge labour force who are lower skilled operatives". This raised two key points for their longer-term assimilation and indeed for the development of the local economy. Firstly, there is a need for 'cross-training' initiatives. Whilst the aid package provided assistance for skills upgrading to level 2, it was clear that a greater effort is required given the requirements of the growth sectors. Secondly, it suggested a need for geographical mobility on the part of the least skilled workers coming out of
Longbridge, yet blue collar mobility is often a real problem in such situations (ibid).
Although the 'cost' of closure fell most heavily on those unable to shift into new employment, those back in work have experienced substantial losses, as a study by the Work Foundation for the BBC (Radio 4) has found, with ex-MG-Rover workers back in full-time employment earning around £3500 a year less and those in part-time £10,500 less with only those in self-employment now earning more (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong et al 2008) . Furthermore, nearly half viewed their 'new' job as worse than their MG-Rover job. Also, the loss of security means an increased likelihood of unemployment in future years, thus adding to stress levels. As Armstrong (ibid) notes, longer term policies are required to build skill levels in
Birmingham and tackle growing labour market polarisation and inequality.
While it is important to protect and nurture the supply chain and thereby attempt to 'embed' global firms, regional development policy also needs to foster knowledge intensive competencies through the regional 'collective learning' which is central to the development of a successful milieu or set of territorial relationships. Camagni (1991) sees these developing tacitly through factors such as the local labour market, customer-supplier technical and organisational interchange, imitation processes, reverse engineering, exhibition of successful 'climatisation', application of general technology to local needs, 'cafeteria' effects and specialised service provision.
Similarly, Keeble et al (1999) see regional collective learning as "the emergence of basic common knowledge and procedures across a set of geographically proximate firms which facilitates co-operation and solutions to problems" through establishing a common language, trust, shared technological knowledge, as well as tacit codes of conduct. This links in turn with the concepts of the 'learning region' and 'regional innovation systems'.
In this sense a regional cluster policy has the potential to take a holistic approach focused on 'soft infrastructure' and competence building (Lundequist and Power, 2002) . Implemented in this way, the cluster approach has the potential to increase the regional technology base and develop ties between footloose transnational firms and the locality (see Malecki, 1997) . However, by concentrating support through the Accelerate programme, rather than through the developing cluster policy, the RTF made relatively little progress in this direction. It is clear however that providing the 'soft support' associated with the learning economy represents a major challenge (see Storper, 1997) , not least for an RDA lacking power and resources over many of the areas in question.
Although unable to mobilise forces in time to address these deeper structural issues, AWM did at least recognise the need for a broad approach. Thus during the period between the two MG-Rover crises a considerable investment in new technology was made at Warwick Manufacturing Group where more than £30 was made available by a combination of the DTI (BERR) and AWM for the PARD 7 Programme. This encompassed a range of high tech projects, including advanced materials (formability of composites and alloys of aluminium and steel), joining and assembly technologies, electronics (testing rather than development) and hybrid systems, and was an attempt to both 'kick-start' new technology and to 'embed' Ford in the region. Although a review of PARD has yet to be undertaken it is apparent that it has achieved many of its short term goals. However, the longer term sustainability is in doubt without the addition of further public funding. In addition the objective of keeping Ford in the region was unrealistic given the scale of the parent company's losses. extended eligibility to companies outside the West Midlands this was both short-term and a minor aspect of the overall package which was not renewed in subsequent years. As noted by Peck and McGuiness (2001, in Waters and Lawton Smith, 2002) note "the alternative involving greater collaboration between regions in developing (cluster) strategies has yet to be taken seriously".
Also, whilst MG-Rover's problems have centred on long-seated organisational and management failures, a major contributing factor was the series of national-level policy failures going back to the 1950s 9 as detailed by Holweg, and Oliver (2005) and Bailey et al (2008) . This needs to be recognised for the development of future industrial policy given that the latter is now 'back on the agenda' in some sense. Rover collapse deserves close scrutiny in this respect. In the report, AWM and local actors are given high marks for their response to the crisis; helping 4000 workers back into work was indeed a major achievement, although it should be stressed that there remains much to be done for the remaining unemployed workers. 10 There is also acknowledgement that the knock-on effects of the MG-Rover crash on the supply chain were not as severe as first anticipated thanks to the actions of RTF1 and AWM in working to diversify firms away from MG-Rover over the previous five years. As noted, as many as 10,000-12,000 jobs were 'saved' in this way.
Whilst the media has focused on the NAO's criticism of government actions, such as spending £6.5 million to pay the MG-Rover wage bill for 5 days to see if the Chinese vehicle maker, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, could be tempted to buy the company as a going concern, a more substantial criticism of the DTI, only partly recognised by the report, is that it took so long to realise that MG-Rover was struggling and then rushed into contingency planning that focused too much on how to deal with a collapse of the firm. "the penny dropped for the DTI on the dire state of MGR only in 2004, sometime after Ms Hewitt's endorsement of the Phoenix Four. This was way too late, and in the following months the DTI was trying to play catch up when the company was fast approaching the end game".
It is clear that in those dying days little could have been done. However, taken as a whole, the NAO Report does not make as comfortable reading for the DTI as some government ministers have claimed.
In the whole saga of the protracted demise of MG-R there are important lessons to be learnt for industrial policy design and delivery.
Reconsidering Industrial Policy
Firstly, a general point is that the strengths and importance of British industry are often underestimated by policy makers. Whilst manufacturing accounts for just onesixth of Britain's GDP (GVA), it still accounts for thee-quarters of all business R&D and two-thirds of British exports (Hutton, 2007) . Too often 'traditional' manufacturing is seen as inferior to the 'knowledge' intensive service sector. This is superficial as much of the remaining manufacturing base is very much 'knowledge intensive' and the two sectors have blurred to the point where it is difficult to disentangle one from the other. Underpinning car production itself is a wide range of research and design across many disciplines that is provided by firms classed within 'service' sectors. In addition, car-buyers also purchase a complex package of services including finance, maintenance, insurance and so on, all of which provide downstream service sector jobs -which considerably outnumber those in the upstream supply matrix (MacNeill, 2003) .
To compete in high-technology and cross-sectoral activities, the UK needs investment in the knowledge base and long term strategies. As the economics journalist Will Hutton (1999) has consistently argued, investment pay-back periods are often too short and rates of return hurdles too high. Whilst this comment refers to industry itself, it is often also true of public policy and, as a result, investment per employee and in R&D remain relatively weak by international standards contributing to lower productivity levels in Britain than in the US, France and Germany. Whilst patent figures need to be interpreted with much care, DTI figures show that for £10m invested in R&D, Britain produced only 1.8 patents against 4.4 in the US (Hussain, 2007) . Adding in the skills gap identified in the Leitch Review (Leitch, 2005) , some of the challenges for business and policy-makers become clearer. In spite of a major investment in skills and plans for change, Leitch concluded that Britain will only have managed to "run to stand still" by 2020, whilst international competition will have intensified further. It is therefore unsurprising that Britain has seen a more rapid rundown than any other European economy, with well over a million manufacturing job losses in the last ten years. Too much manufacturing capacity may have been lost, and the failure to develop the new, dynamic manufacturing industries of the future may create future economic problems (see Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004 Unfortunately, however short-term extraction of rents has all too often been seen as the main priority as the dominance of such measures in publicly financed support for the automotive industry over the last ten years illustrates.
To be fair the RDA clearly recognised many of these issues. It adopted clusters as its main economic development tool, albeit with DTI 'guidance', a policy which has the potential to facilitate knowledge based networking (Steiner, 2006) , amongst a range of 'up-stream' and 'downstream' players, and link together long and short term policies (Benneworth and Henry, 2004) . However, at the time of the first Rover crisis the Agency was unable to harness longer term policy in parallel with the short term emergency measures. It is also fair to observe that in the initial stages it did have a sufficient understanding of the cluster concept. Its difficulties in building a cluster support organisation for the medical technology cluster have been documented by Burfitt et al (2007) and similar issues arose with the automotive cluster. However, unlike in the former case, where the different agendas of public sector institutions were problematic, in the automotive case it was the short term interests of a number of the region's larger companies that prevailed -in particular MG-Rover. AWM's frustration resulted in them by-passing the Accelerate Management Board, then chaired by the MD of MG-Rover, and providing the major funding at Warwick Manufacturing Group described above.
However, some progress towards addressing the longer term needs was made. For example, considerable resources were made available to retrain workers, but mainly up to level 2 (GSCE equivalent) skills. Whilst this was a good start, future manufacturing, and the new growth industries, will require level 3 or 4 skills. In other words, the UK needs to go further and faster to compete in high-value added activities in a globalising economy.
Concluding Comments
Whilst the MG-Rover collapse was a substantial shock to the west Midlands economy, the impact would have been much greater if the firm had collapsed in 2000.
The five years of continued production over 2000-2005 allowed many suppliers to adjust and diversify away from MG-Rover, aided by the work of the first RTF. This was a very real 'success' for local policy makers. The response after the collapse was also a major effort that minimised job losses. Challenges remain, however, especially for the least well-skilled workers as the manufacturing base hollows-out locally, with high levels of local unemployment and a low-skills base in much of the Birmingham economy.
The MG-Rover case raises a number of critical issues. Firstly, the coordination of regionally based 'cluster' policies where the 'cluster' in question crosses administrative regional boundaries, calls for a more coordinated approach to join up regionally based policies. Work by AWM at the regional level would be more effective in building local competencies if the fragmentation of regional level policy delivery was properly addressed. Secondly it is clear that in common with other RDAs the Agency lacked resources for economic development. In the West Midlands case the retention in 2000 of £129 million of RSA assistance within the region that had been earmarked for BMW plus another £176 million in 2005 to pick up the pieces after the collapse was an implicit recognition that AWM had neither sufficient staff or financial resources the to tackle a problem of this scale. It therefore needed to rely pre-existing structures and funding mechanisms and was therefore only able to address the short term issues. In doing so it was constrained by the limitations of preexisting policies as mechanisms to tackle the longer term needs of the region to invest in higher level skills and technology.
Even today, some eight years after the initial Rover crisis, RDAs in general have limited flexibility in utilising the resources available to them, being heavily constrained by pre-ordained silos of funding from central government. Although funding is now in the form of a block grant or 'single pot', with the ability to vire across budgets, central government has set very specific targets for RDAs to meet, which considerably limit their room for manoeuvre (Fuller et al, 2002) . The paradox thus arises that RDAs are overly constrained in terms of their ability to pursue strategic objectives in terms of regional industrial policy, but that their efforts to foster the development of local 'clusters' or sectors are insufficiently coordinated on a national or inter-regional basis.
Whilst AWM and the RTF have genuinely attempted to improve regional economic prospects by attempting to diversify, modernise and regenerate those areas most affected by the shake-out in the auto industry and through building regional competencies and social capital, there remains the key question of who is "joining it all up" properly at the regional, inter-regional and national level and how to take a strategic and long term view of economic development policy against a background of short term imperatives.
